Commonwealth Court Again Holds That Penalty Award Is Mandatory On Finding Of Bad Faith

[NOTE: The Commonwealth Court decision reported in this post has been overruled by the Supreme Court. See my new post on the Supreme Court’s July 2016 ruling that a finding of bad faith does not mandate an award of fees and penalties.]

In a recent, unpublished opinion, in the case of Klipper Construction Associates, Inc. v. Warwick Township Water and Sewer Authority, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed its recent holding in A. Scott Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Allentown (Oct. 2014), and has held again that a finding of bad faith on the part of a public agency in withholding payment from a public contractor mandates the award of a penalty. This is from the Court’s decision:

Contractor’s assertion that the trial court erred in failing to award any penalty is correct. As noted above, a finding of bad faith requires the trial court to make a penalty award under Section 3935(a) of the Prompt Pay Act. A. Scott Enterprises, Inc., __ A.3d at __, 2014 WL 5335358 at *7. We must therefore reverse the trial court on this issue.

What is “bad faith”? Section 3935(a) of the Procurement Code has this to say about bad faith:

An amount shall be deemed to have been withheld in bad faith to the extent that the withholding was arbitrary or vexatious. An amount shall not be deemed to have been withheld in bad faith to the extent it was withheld pursuant to section 3934 (relating to withholding of payment for good faith claims).

The takeaway? If you are a public contractor denied payment by a public entity and can show bad faith – arbitrary or vexatious conduct – on the part of the public entity, then you will be awarded a penalty which might be as high as 1% per month on the amount owed. If you are the public entity and are withholding payment from the contractor, then you must fully comply with section 3934 of the Procurement Code to avoid a finding of bad faith.

The Commonwealth Court decision can be found here. My earlier post on the A. Scott Enterprises case can be found here.

Posted on December 31, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Court Decisions, Procurement Code, Public Works Payment Rules Comments Off

Payment Rights, Obligations and Remedies on Pennsylvania Public Works Projects

On Thursday, November 6, 2014, I gave a dinner presentation to the Southeast District meeting of the National Utility Contractors Association (Pennsylvania). The topic was “Payment Rights, Obligations and Remedies on Public Works Projects.” If you would like a copy of the PowerPoint presentation, send me an email, and I’ll be happy to send it along.

Posted on November 14, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Public Works Payment Rules Comments Off

Commonwealth Court Rules That Award Of Fees And Penalty Is Mandatory On Finding Of Bad Faith

In a recently published opinion, the Commonwealth Court has held that a finding of bad faith by a public entity in refusing to make payment to a public contractor mandates the award of attorney’s fees and the statutory penalty of 1% per month.

In 2009, the City of Allentown (Allentown) awarded a road paving contract to A. Scott Enterprises (Scott). After mobilization, the job was suspended when a pile of contaminated dirt was discovered at the job site. Scott resumed some of its work and then left the job site while the parties negotiated Scott’s costs. The parties were unable to agree on payment for the additional costs to deal with the job suspension and the contaminated soil.

Scott then filed suit to recover its losses on the project, and was awarded damages of $927,299. The jury also found that Allentown breached the contract and acted in bad faith in refusing to make payment to Scott for its contract damages and suspension costs. However, despite the finding of bad faith, the trial court refused to award Scott attorney’s fees, the statutory penalty of 1% per month, and pre- and post-judgment interest. Scott appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

On appeal, Allentown argued that an award of fees and penalties was discretionary with the trial court. The Commonwealth Court rejected Allentown’s arguments, and held that the jury finding of bad faith mandated an award of fees and penalties to Scott:

The purpose of the Procurement Code is to “level the playing field” between government agencies and contractors. See Pietrini Corp. v. Agate Construction Co., 2006 PA Super. 140, 901 A.2d 1050, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2006). It advances this goal by requiring a government agency that has acted in bad faith to pay the contractor’s legal costs, as well as an interest penalty. Otherwise, the finding of bad faith is a meaningless exercise with no consequence for the government agency found to have acted in bad faith. We conclude that Section 3935 of the Procurement Code requires the imposition of attorney’s fees and the statutory penalty upon a jury’s finding of bad faith. See City of Independence v. Kerr Construction Paving Company, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 315, 321-23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that Missouri’s procurement code’s use of “may” regarding penalty interest and attorney’s fees means “shall” and upon finding of bad faith by jury, trial court must award such damages, even though the extent of damages is a matter for the discretion of trial judge).

On the question of when the public agency must make payment to the contractor, the Commonwealth Court had this to say:

There was conflicting evidence on the exact amount the City owed Contractor. However, the City had an obligation to make a good faith effort to pay for Contractor’s suspension costs and to pay those invoices it did not challenge. 62 Pa. C.S. §3932. If the City disputed the amount of a suspension invoice, it was required to so notify Contractor, withhold the disputed amount and pay the remainder of the invoices. Instead the City paid nothing.

While the Commonwealth Court held that an award of fees and penalties was mandatory, the amount to award is within the trial court’s discretion. The case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine the award of reasonable attorney’s fees.

The takeaway from this decision is that public agencies have a clear duty to determine what is owed to a contractor and to pay that amount. They cannot simply throw up their hands and refuse to make any payment because there is a dispute over some items of work. The Commonwealth Court’s holding strengthens the hand of public contractors in Pennsylvania, and puts public agencies on notice that the Procurement Code has real teeth and that they will be held accountable for bad faith conduct in refusing to make proper and timely payment to their contractors

The Commonwealth Court’s opinion can be found here.

Posted on November 6, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Court Decisions, Procurement Code, Public Works Payment Rules Comments Off

Procurement Code Is Not Violated Where Only One Price Is Considered In Contract Award

Can a Commonwealth agency consider just a single bidder’s price and refuse to even look at the prices of other bidders in making a competitive contract award? According to a recent, unpublished decision of the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, the answer is yes.

In January 2014, the Pa. Department of Community and Economic Development (Department) issued a Request for Quotation (RFQ) seeking a contractor to design, market, and implement a sale of tax credits. The RFQ specified that only those bidders whose technical submittal received at least 70% of the available technical points would be considered “responsible” and eligible for selection on the basis of price. The Department received three bids. After applying the scoring criteria to the bidders’ technical submittals, the Department eliminated all but one bidder for selection on the basis of price. A protest was filed by one of the eliminated bidders. The Department denied the protest, and an appeal was then taken to the Commonwealth Court.

On appeal, the bidder argued that, by applying a scoring threshold that eliminated all but one bidder and by failing to compare the selected bidder’s price to the other bidders’ prices, the Department violated the requirement of section 513(g) of the Procurement Code that an agency take price into account when awarding a contract.

Section 513(g) of the Procurement Code states:

(g) Selection for negotiation.–The responsible offeror whose proposal is determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the purchasing agency, taking into consideration price and all evaluation factors, shall be selected for contract negotiation.

The Commonwealth Court rejected the bidder’s argument, holding:

Section 513(g) requires a purchasing agency to take price into consideration when determining which “responsible offeror” should be selected for contract negotiation. This provision neither requires a purchasing agency to revisit its determination that an offeror is not responsible nor does it prohibit a purchasing agency from applying announced criteria to determine that all but one offeror is non-responsible. Here, the Department was faced with only one offeror who met the RFQ’s criteria to be considered a responsible offeror. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the Department erred or violated the Procurement Code by considering the cost submittal of that offeror alone.

From a purely legalistic viewpoint, the Commonwealth Court is correct in interpreting section 513(g). But from a competitive bidding viewpoint, where the taxpayers are served by true competition where all bidders’ prices are exposed and considered, there is something just a bit uneasy about allowing a Commonwealth agency to award a contract based on just one price without knowing whether the other prices were lower. In this case, was the winning bidder’s proposal truly the “most advantageous” to the Commonwealth, if the other bidders’ prices were lower and if the other bidders were also nonetheless qualified to perform the contract, notwithstanding their failure to meet a scoring threshold, considering that technical scoring and comparison of bidders’ qualifications are inherently subjective while the comparison of bidders’ prices is purely objective.

The unpublished decision of the Commonwealth Court can be found here.

Posted on October 14, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Protests, Court Decisions, Procurement Code Comments Off

Commonwealth Court: Bidder Qualification Criteria Can Be Waived Under Gaeta Decision

If a public entity issues a bid and specifies that bidders must have certain minimum experience, can the public entity waive those requirements for the low bidder? In my view, the answer is no.

Ordinarily, specified qualification criteria are for the benefit of the public and are intended to place all prospective bidders on a level playing field by informing them of the minimum qualifications and experience that are required for a contract award. If the public entity specifies, e.g., five years’ experience in the particular work covered by the bid, bidders with less than five years’ experience will likely refrain from bidding knowing that they would be ineligible for an award. For this reason, changing or relaxing the qualification criteria after the bids are opened is usually a no-no and a violation of the level playing field rule. If the public entity decides, after the bid has opened, to award the contract to a bidder with, say, only three years’ experience, the public entity has effectively excluded from the bidding, unfairly and to its detriment, the pool of bidders with only three years’ experience.

In a recent, opinion dealing with a protest on a Commonwealth of Pa. RFP, JPay, Inc. v. Department of Corrections, the Commonwealth Court held that qualification criteria stated in a bid or an RFP could in fact be waived by the public entity under the Gaeta v. Ridley School District decision. This holding breaks new ground in the area of bidder responsibility.

In 2012, the Pa. Department of Corrections issued an RFP for a turn-key “kiosk-like system” that would allow prison inmates to perform such tasks as placing commissary orders, downloading digital media, checking phone time, and receive and send emails. The RFP required that each proposal contain an appendix detailing the offeror’s prior experience on at least three prior projects with “at least one (1) project where your firm has implemented a project of similar size and scope and one (1) project you have completed that is related to Kiosk like solutions.” The offeror was also required to include client references for each project, and to “provide examples [of] prior experience in providing MP3 players, downloadable digital entertainment (music), communication (email) and information through kiosks designed for a correctional environment” with examples and references related to the provision of those services within the previous five years. The RFP also stated that the only two requirements were mandatory: that the bid be signed and timely received. On the other hand, the RFP reserved the right to waive technical or immaterial nonconformities in the bid. Three bids were received, and Global Tel*Link (GTL) was selected for negotiations.

One of the bidders, JPay, Inc., filed a protest, claiming among other things that GTL was not a qualified bidder. The contracting officer responded to the protest that GTL satisfactorily demonstrated its prior experience by submitting ten references which demonstrated that GTL was in the process of implementing a similar kiosk system in South Carolina prison facilities and was planning to install such a system in Kentucky by the end of 2013. The protest was denied and JPay filed an appeal to the Commonwealth Court.

On appeal, JPay’s argument was framed as follows: “JPay alleges that, based upon information it has uncovered outside the RFP process, GTL provided inaccurate information in its submission and therefore could not have met the minimum technical requirements outlined in the 2012 RFP or earned the highest technical score.”

On this point, the Commonwealth Court stated:

The Designee held that the requirement in the 2012 RFP that offerors submit information related to their prior experience was not mandatory and OA was therefore authorized to either waive this requirement or consider it in the scoring. Even assuming JPay’s allegations regarding GTL’s experience are true, we agree with the Designee’s conclusion. The text of the 2012 RFP was clear that there were only two mandatory requirements — the timeliness of receipt of the proposal and signature of the offeror on the proposal — and that OA could waive any other non-conformity, allow the offeror to cure or consider the non-conformity in the scoring. While the 2012 RFP provides that offerors “must” submit information related to their experience on prior projects, a requirement phrased in the imperative does not necessarily make the requirement mandatory.

In my view, the Court’s opinion represents a monumental shift in thinking found in numerous public bidding decisions from years past. While it is true that whether a bidder is qualified or responsible is typically a decision vested within the sound discretion of the public officials making that decision, and that courts are loathe to second guess decisions on bidder qualifications and responsibility, at the same time it has also been true that specified qualification criteria cannot be changed after the bids have been opened. To allow the criteria to be changed dramatically or waived entirely, as the Court now suggests is permitted under Gaeta, unlevels the playing field, and invites the potential for favoritism and corruption into the public bidding process.

I, for one, see great potential for harm in the court’s decision. The holding in JPay, Inc. now opens the door wide open to the potential for all sorts of mischief hidden under the guise of public officials determining whether a bidder meets the pre-specified qualification criteria.

The Court’s decision can be found here.

Posted on August 26, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Protests, Bid Specifications, Bidder Responsibility, Procurement Code Comments Off

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms No Right To Hearing On Protest Filed Under Pa. Procurement Code

Is there a right to a hearing on a bid protest filed under the Pa. Procurement Code? The answer is no.

In a recent, unreported decision involving a contract issued by the Philadelphia Parking Authority for a new red light camera system in the city of Philadelphia, the Commonwealth Court has re-affirmed long-standing precedent that a hearing is not mandatory on a protest filed under the Pa. Procurement Code. Under 62 Pa. C.S. § 1711.1(e), whether to conduct a hearing is within the “sole discretion” of the head of the purchasing agency. The Commonwealth Court also held that, under the Pa. Procurement Code, 62 Pa. C.S. § 1711.1(d), it is not mandatory for a contracting officer to file a response to a protest before issuance of a determination by the agency head. Finally, the Commonwealth Court found that the denial of a stay of procurement was not in error where the agency head had determined that the protest was clearly without merit and had articulated the substantial interests that would be harmed by a stay.

A copy of the Commonwealth Court decision in Am. Traffic Solutions, Inc. v. Phila. Parking Auth., can be found here.

Posted on July 17, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Protests, Court Decisions, Procurement Code Comments Off

Public Bidding 101: Are Proprietary Specifications Permissible?

On a public bid can a public entity direct a contractor to furnish and install equipment made by only one manufacturer? This question is raised often by clients who complain when the specifications they are bidding against are viewed as “proprietary” in nature. Is this legal, they ask? Can the public entity really limit the specified equipment to a sole manufacturer? As always, the answer is, “it depends,” although it is safe to say that all proprietary specifications should be viewed initially as inherently suspect and contrary to the spirit of public and competitive bidding.

The rare, but easy to justify case is where the equipment specified is intended to complement or replace existing unique equipment. Thus, in Silsby Mfg. Co. v. City of Allentown, 153 Pa. 319, 26 A. 646 (1893), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the purchase of replacement flues for a patented engine, which could not be bought from any other supplier, was not subject to competitive bidding. In the same vein, if the public entity could buy such unique equipment without competitive bidding, the public entity will likely be permitted to specify the same equipment in the specifications for a contract to furnish and install the same equipment. Read more

Posted on July 10, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Specifications, Court Decisions, Public Bidding 101 Comments Off

Contract Award Is Not A Contract, But Bidder May Pursue Claim For Damages For Posting Of Bonds

When is a contract award a contract? Virtually never. Rather, a contract award is just that – an award. It is not a binding contract and imposes no obligation on the public entity. In the words of Billie Jean King, a contract award is as fleeting as victory.

Recently, in the case of Allan A. Myers LP v. Montgomery County, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania re-affirmed this long-standing principle of public contracting law. In 2011, Montgomery County issued a request for proposals for roadwork. After rejecting a bid from another bidder, the Montgomery County Commissioners adopted a resolution accepting the bid of Allan A. Myers LP (Myers). Later, when the contract award to Myers was challenged by the rejected bidder, the County Commissioners adopted a second resolution rescinding the award to Myers. Thereafter, Myers filed suit, seeking damages for breach of contract. The trial court rejected the claim, holding that merely awarding a contract does not create a binding obligation on the public entity to actually execute a contract.

On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, Myers argued that a contract was formed when the County Commissioners adopted the resolution accepting the bid and awarding a contract to Myers. Myers also argued that it was entitled to pursue damages for the costs related to procuring the required bonds under a non-contractual theory of recovery. The Commonwealth Court rejected the appeal by Myers, holding that the Second Class County Code governed the award of the contract to Myers and required a signed, written contract (and not simply a resolution). The Commonwealth Court followed the seminal case of Crouse, Inc. v. School District of Braddock, 19 A.2d 843 (Pa. 1941), where the Supreme Court reasoned that:

When a municipal body advertises for bids for public work and receives what appears to be a satisfactory bid, it is within the contemplation of both bidder and acceptor that no contractual relation shall arise therefrom until a written contract embodying all material terms of the offer and acceptance has been formally entered into. The motion whose adoption is evidenced by the minutes of the school district in the instant case meant merely that the proposal was accepted subject to the preparation and execution of a formal contract or subject to the motion being rescinded before the contract was executed. A preliminary declaration of intention to enter into a formal contract, which was all the motion adopted amounted to, did not in any way limit the school directors’ freedom of future action.

Thus, Montgomery County was free to rescind the award to Myers without liability for breach of contract. The first lesson here is that the public entity holds virtually all of the cards in the public bidding and contracting context. Until a formal public contract is signed and executed, there is no contract. It’s as simple as that.

On the other hand, the Commonwealth Court gave Myers a green light to pursue its claim for damages from having to post bonds in order to preserve its contract award. In its Complaint against Montgomery County, Myers had alleged that the procurement of the bonds impaired its “ability to seek or to secure other contracts and work which required bonds.” Of course, how strong this claim is remains to be proven.

Significantly, to my knowledge, this is the first time that an appellate court in Pennsylvania has allowed the potential recovery of damages related to the rescission of a public contract award. Normally, a disappointed bidder has no right to recover damages, and the Commonwealth Court reiterated this long-standing rule by advising Myers that it could not seek damages for any expenses related to procuring the bonds in connection with its bid as these expenses would have been incurred by all bidders. See J.P. Mascaro & Sons, Inc. v. Bristol Township, 505 A.2d 1071, 1073 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986)(a disappointed bidder has sustained no injury which entitles him to redress in court).

So, the second lesson here is that, if you receive a contract award, and post the necessary bonds, and the contract award is then rescinded, you may be able to recover damages relating to the posting of the bonds. Of course, such a claim will be exceedingly difficult to prove.

The decision in Allan A. Myers LP v. Montgomery County can be found here.

Posted on June 17, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Protests, Court Decisions Comments Off

Commonwealth Court Finds Ambiguity In Bid Spec Creates Bidding Defect Requiring A Re-Bid

Does an ambiguous bid specification create an unlevel playing field? The answer has almost always been yes, and a recent Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court decision reiterates that long-standing principle of public bidding law.

In 2011, Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh sought bids for a contract to process recyclable materials. Greenstar Pittsburgh, LLC (Greenstar), a disappointed bidder, brought suit, along with an individual taxpayer, to enjoin the contract award to Pittsburgh Recycling Services (PRS) and to compel issuance of a new bid. Greenstar argued that language in the bidding specifications was open to more than one reasonable interpretation and provided PRS with an unfair advantage in the bidding process. The trial court agreed, and determined that the following language in the bid specification was ambiguous:

3.3 QUALIFICATIONS OF BIDDERS

The Contractor’s facility shall be located within a fifteen (15) mile radius from the City’s Department of Public Works . . . located at 30th and A.V.R.R.

The bidding specifications included numerous references to the Contractor’s “processing facility” and a “receiving site.” As a result, the trial court concluded that Section 3.3 was ambiguous because the word “facility” could reasonably be used to denote either “other receiving site” or the “Contractor’s processing facility.”

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. In affirming the trial court, the Commonwealth Court first noted the law governing ambiguity in public bidding specifications:

Our Supreme Court has also recognized that the common standard required to ensure free and fair competition among bidders extends to the form as well as the substance of an invitation to bid for a public contract. In Guthrie v. Armstrong, 303 Pa. 11, 154 A. 33 (1931), the Court concluded that: “The form of the contract is often as vital as anything involved in the transaction, and, unless bidders are on an equality as to knowledge of its proposed provisions, there may be a great advantage to a bidder who has a certain understanding with which the public authorities may agree, over a bidder whose understanding is otherwise.” 303 Pa. at 18, 154 A. at 35. Where a public authority has issued an invitation to bid with provisions subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, while the authority may not have acted in bad faith, the effect may be the same: the common standard is eroded and the public authority can no longer ensure that the public has gained the benefit of fair and just competition among bidders. … As with an ambiguous contract provision, if a provision in bidding specifications is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, the ambiguous provision must be interpreted against the drafter.

In affirming, the Commonwealth Court agreed that it was reasonable to interpret Section 3.3 to mandate the contractor’s processing facility or the contractor’s other receiving site to be located within the specified 15 mile radius, and concluded that Section 3.3 was ambiguous on its face. Because of this ambiguity, the Commonwealth Court recognized that the pool of bidders interested in participating in the bidding process could be impacted:

We are left to speculate how many potential bidders failed to participate in the bidding process because they did not have the interpretation shared by [Allegheny County and Pittsburgh] and PRS and instead shared the same reasonable interpretation of Section 3.3 made by Greenstar.

The hallmark of public bidding is a level playing field, and ambiguous bid specifications are an inherently unleveling force. Greenstar recognizes this. So, if you are a bidder encountering an ambiguous bid specification which can affect, e.g., how you compute your bid price, or whether you are qualified to bid, you have encountered an unlevel playing field. In such case, it is extremely likely that your bid protest will be successful.

The decision in Greenstar Pittsburgh LLC v. Allegheny County can be found here.

A hat tip to my friend and former colleague Wally Zimolong, Esq., who brought this case to my attention and who also blogged about it at his blog Supplemental Conditions.

Posted on June 6, 2014 by Christopher I. McCabe, Esq. in Bid Protests, Bid Responsiveness, Bid Specifications, Court Decisions Comments Off

City Of Philadelphia Contractor Charged With Mail Fraud

Add yet another contractor to the list of victims of the investigative prowess of the City of Philadelphia’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG).

On May 19, 2014, as a result of an OIG investigation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office charged Airmatic, Inc., a woman-owned, Malvern-based firm doing business with the City of Philadelphia, with defrauding the City of approximately $556,633.03. It is alleged that Airmatic supplied “unapproved, off-contract products” to various City departments in violation of its contracts with the City. If convicted, Airmatic faces a maximum possible sentence of five years of probation, a $500,000 fine, or twice the pecuniary gain/loss, a $400 special assessment, and restitution to the City of Philadelphia.

The takeaway on this latest prosecution against a City contractor? If you are thinking of pulling a fast one by the City, don’t. You will get caught, and you will be punished.

The FBI press release on the charges against Airmatic can be found here. The Information against Airmatic can be found here. The Philly.com article on the charges against Airmatic can be found here.